























































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































{Tobinqit,Tobinq_proxyit} = β0 + β1 Institutionit +∑Con tr ol + εit （1）
其中，{Tobinqit,Tobinq_proxyit}表示衡量公司价值的两个替代指标，Institutionit 表示机构投资者的持










































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































Institutionit = β0 + β1Tobinqit + β2Firm ageit + β3Turnoverit + β4Volatilityit +∑Con tr ol + εit （3）
{Institution_dummyit,Institution_highit} =
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Abstract: The cash dividend policy directly decides institutional investors’choice of income patterns—long-term holding for
value investment or short-term and frequent dealing for spread profit, and then influences whether institutional investors would
help improve corporate value. Using 7159 firm-year observations of Chinese A-share listed companies during 2005 to 2010, we
find that institutional investors can enhance corporate value if and only if the companies (continually) pay (high) cash divi-
dend. At the same time, institutional investors’ownership should be large enough. We test for potential problems of endogene-
ity, econometric model selection, and variable measurement, and find our results to be robust.
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